[The following is a “new and improved” version of the June 2012 edition of Resolution Strategies]
In one of my favorite books on negotiation, “The Science of Settlement: Ideas for Negotiators,” Professor Barry Goldman devotes 64 of his 167 pages to the topic of “bargaining confounds,” which he describes as the “psychological factors that can enter into our negotiations and screw up our results.”
One of the bargaining confounds he examines is the concept of “reactive devaluation,” which he defines as “the tendency to undervalue or reject a negotiation proposal, irrespective of its merits, because it is perceived to come from the enemy.” In other words, we automatically assume that any proposal made by our negotiating opponents must be bad for us because it is presumably good for them.
Reactive devaluation is premised, in part, upon the assumption that there is a fixed-pie to be distributed and that negotiations are therefore “zero-sum,” i.e., one more for you necessarily means one less for me. However, as the following example illustrates, that isn’t always the case.
Borrowing one of Professor Goldman’s hypotheticals, and embellishing upon it to some degree, imagine that an attorney named Adam received a text message from his wife asking him to stop at the market to pick up a few things, including “a dozen apples and a dozen oranges.”
Upon arriving at the market, Adam headed straight to the fruit section, where he bumped into Eve, a high-profile litigator with a well-deserved reputation as a shrewd negotiator. Adam had opposed Eve in three highly contentious matters over the years and each time Eve had negotiated the better deal.
Coincidentally, Eve also had “a dozen apples and a dozen oranges” on her shopping list, but she and Adam immediately noticed there were only twelve apples and twelve oranges left in the bins. To his surprise, Eve offered to let Adam take all twelve apples in exchange for Eve taking all twelve oranges. His suspicions aroused, and wondering whether she knew something he didn’t, Adam reactively devalued Eve’s offer and rejected it — albeit politely — for that reason alone.
Eve then explained she needed all twelve oranges because it was her daughter’s turn to bring orange slices to share with the soccer team during half-time. Not wanting Eve to “win” another of their “negotiations,” and knowing that his wife had asked him to bring home apples AND oranges, Adam respectfully declined Eve’s offer and proposed that they instead divvy up the fruit evenly, with each taking six apples and six oranges. Reluctantly, Eve agreed.
Feeling rather smug, Adam returned home only to learn that his wife had made a commitment to provide a dozen caramel apples for the next day’s school carnival. In other words, the six apples he had given to Eve were of greater value to his wife than the six oranges he received in return.
If Adam had taken a moment to call or text his wife from the market, rather than reactively devaluing Eve’s offer and insisting on “winning” what he wrongly assumed was a zero-sum game, he would have discovered that Eve’s proposal was actually in BOTH of their interests.
Unless the parties are willing to reveal their underlying interests to one another, win/win solutions seldom present themselves. Reactive devaluation — especially when combined with the assumption of a fixed pie — can be so overpowering that the parties neglect to even consider whether there could be other solutions that might be mutually beneficial.
As demonstrated by the parable of Adam’s Apples, the proverbial pie might not be fixed after all. When you take the time to consider other ways it might be sliced, you might discover there is actually more for everyone — qualitatively speaking — than you thought. Put another way, comparing apples and oranges can sometimes yield more fruit.
As always, it would be my pleasure to assist you and your clients in the dispute resolution process. Please don’t hesitate to contact me if I can be of service.
Best regards,
Floyd J. Siegal